Ariel Rubinstein ， professor of economics at the universities of Tel Aviv and Princeton. The Faculty of Economic Sciences confers an honorary doctorate on him for his outstanding research accomplishments in economics and game theory. Rubinsteins research on negotiation theory has provided new insights in labour economics and the theory of finance. In addition, his theoretical work has led to a better understanding of the way political coalitions are created. Rubinstein does not shy away from interdisciplinary research: he has worked on the interface between economics and law, built bridges between economics and information science, and published both on economic psychology and on language and economics

 Modelling bounded rationality

Professor Ariel Rubinstein will be the first Zeuthen lecturer, a most distinguished and original researcher in economic theory. With his pathbreaking results, Ariel Rubinstein has made substantial contributions to several fields in economics, particularly game theory. His work is characterized by the combination of deep originality and surprising simplicity.

Professor Rubinstein has a background in mathematics (M.Sc.1976, Hebrew University) as well as in economics (Ph.D. 1979, Hebrew University). He has been associated with some of the world's most prestigious universities and research institutions, including Nuffield College in Oxford, Bell Laboratories, London School of Economics, and he currently holds posts at Princeton and Tel-Aviv University. He has been invited to give several international special lectures, such as the Walras-Bowley Lecture at the Econometric Society Meeting in Minnesota (1988), the CORE Lectures in Louvain-La-Neuve (1995), and the Churchil Lecture in Cambridge (1996). The Zeuthen Lectures come as a natural succession.

Until recently Ariel Rubinstein's scientific work was concentrated mainly on game theory, or the abstract theory of conflict. Probably best known are his contributions on the so-called bargaining problem, which is of fundamental importance to economics.

lt consists basically of the study of a situation of complete opposite interests between two parties,a typical example being wage negotiation. The recent Nobel laureate John Nash was concerned with the bargaining problem in some of his main writings and formulated the axiomatic bargaining theory. This problem was also at the heart of Frederik Zeuthen's work. Even after the contributions of Nash and Zeuthen it remained evident that a fully developed strategic counterpart of Nash's axiomatic theory was missing. In an important series of articles, starting with one published in Econometrica in 1982, Ariel Rubinstein formulated a coherent and elegant strategic bargaining theory and fully developed its connections to John Nash's axiomatic version. Evidence of the originality of Ariel Rubinsteins research is bom out by his most recent contributions, which come under the heading of "economics and language" and which explain certain basic properties of everyday language.In his Zeuthen Lectures Ariel Rubinstein will analyse yet another fundamental aspect of economic theory, the assumption of rational behaviour. He will discuss ways of reiaxing this assumption instead imposing one of bounded rationality .

Ariel Rubinstein Main Affiliation School of Economics , Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978 Secondary Affiliation Department of Economics,New York University, New York, NY, 10003, USA Telephone +972-3-642-1111 (Home) +972-3-640-9601 (Office, TA)+1-603-388-3630 (e-Fax)

e-mail rariel@post.tau.ac.il

 Homepage http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/

Birth Jerusalem13/4/1951 Family Yael, Michal and Yuval. Citizenship Israel

 Education:The Hebrew University, 1972-1979: 1974: B.Sc. Mathematics, Economics and Statistics 1975: M.A. Economics 1976: M.Sc Mathematics 1979: Ph.D.

 

Economics Permanent Employment:

The Hebrew University (Department of Economics): Senior Lecturer, October 1981 Associate Professor, October 1984 Professor, October 1986-March 1990. Tel Aviv University (Department of Economics): Professor, April 1990- Salzberg Chair, May 1990- Chairperson, July 1991-May 1993.

Princeton University (Department of Economics): Lecturer in Rank of Professor, 1991-2004

 New York University (Department of Economics) Professor, September 2004-

 

 Honors:

Elected fellow of The Econometric Society: 1985 and of the executive committee of The Econometric Society: 1994

Elected foreign honorary member of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1994

Elected foreign honorary member of The American Economic Association: 1995

 Elected fellow of The Israeli Academy of Sciences: 1995

The Michael Bruno memorial award: 2000

Pras Israel: 2002

Doctor Honoris Causa of Tilburg University: 2002

 Honorary Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford: 2002

 President of The Econometric Society: 2004

Member, European Academy of Sciences and Arts: 2004

Nemmers Prize, Northwestern University: 2004

Fellow, European Economic Association: 2004

 

Editorships:

Econometrica: Associate Editor, 1984-1992.

Journal of Economic Theory: Associate Editor, 1986-1994.

Review of Economic Studies: Member of editorial board, 1987-1988;

Foreign Editor, 1988-1992

 Games and Economic Behavior: Associate Editor, 1988-2002 (A letter of resignation from the GT Society)

Review of Economic Design: Member of editorial board, 1993-

Mathematics of Social Sciences: Associate editor, 1993-2001

Economics and Philosophy: Member of editorial board, 1994-

International Journal of Game Theory: Member of editorial board, 1995-2000

 NAJ Economics: Member of editorial board, 2001-

Journal of European Economic Association: Advisory Committe, 2003-

 

Named Lectures:

 The Pazner Lecture, Tel-Aviv, 1982.

The Walras-Bowley Lecture, The Econometric Society Meeting, Minnesota, 1988.

Hooker Lectures, McMaster University, Canada, 1992.

The CORE Lectures, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1995.

The Churchill Lecture, Cambridge, 1996. The Pareto Lecture, Alicante, 1996.

The Zeuthen Lecture, Copenhagen, 1996. The Schwartz Lecture, Northwestern University, 1998(see the lecture pdf)

The Schumpeter Lecturer, EEA, Bolzano, 2000.

Katzir Lecture, Tel Aviv Univerity, 2003.

Woodward Lecture, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2003.

 Presidential Address, The Econometric Society, Providence USA, Melbourne Australia, and Madrid Spain, 2004.

 The Economic Journal Lecture, Nottingham, 2005.

 

Other Special Lectures:

Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society, MIT, 1985.

The XIV Simposio De Analysis Economico, Barcelona, 1989.

 International Conference in Game Theory, Florence, 1991.

Political Economy Lecture Series Harvard University, Harvard, 1991, 2000, 2004.

The European Econometric Society, Masstricht, 1994.

The 11 th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Cracow, 1999.

 International Meeting of the Economic Science Association, New York , 2000

The Southeast Theory and International Conference, Rice, 2000.

Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, Montreal, 2000

The Italian Meeting of Game Theory and Applications, Ischia, 2001.

The XVIII Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Buenos Aires, 2001.

Association for Computational Linguistics, ACL, Sapporo, Japan, 2003.

 

 

Visiting Positions:

Nuffield College, Oxford, (Research Fellow) 1979/80.

Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill (visitor) 1980/1. Math. Sciences Research Ins., Berkeley (member) Fall 1985.

London School of Economics, London 1986-9.

Princeton University (visiting professor) Fall 1987.

University of Chicago (visiting professor) Fall 1988.

University of Pennsylvania (visiting professor) Fall 1989.

 Columbia University (Olin Fellow) Fall 1990. New York University Spring 1996.

Russell-Sage Foundation (Fellow) 96/7.

New York University Fall 2003.

 

 

Short Visits:

1980 IMSSS, Stanford University

1982 C.V.Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1983 Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm

1983 Department of Economics, New York University

1984 Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

1984 Ecole Des Hautes en Sciences Socials, Paris

1985 Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario

1985 IMSSS, Stanford University

1986 IMSSS, Stanford University

1987 Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm

1988 G.R.E.Q.E., Aix-Marseille

1988 Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario

1989 European University, Florence 1989 Bank of Spain, Madrid

1990 Department of Economics, Northwestern University

1992 Department of Economics, McMaster University

1994 Department of Economics, University of Oslo

1995 Department of Economics, Paris X 1996 C.O.R.E., Louvain-La-Neuve.

1996 Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

1997 Netherlands Network of Economics

1998 Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm

1999 Department of Economics, New York University

2000 Department of Economics, Toronto University

 

Political Activities

1969- 1971:Israeli Defince forces(3 years of compulsory service)

1977- 1978:The Movmenet for Different Zionism

March 1978: The "Officers Letter" and Peace Now

1981-1982: Peace Now

 

 

List of Publications:

 Books

Bargaining and Markets, with M.Osborne, Academic Press 1990

The book page (corrections and updates)

A Course in Game Theory, with M.Osborne, MIT Press, 1994.

 The book page (containing: table of contents, corrections and updates, solution manual, prices)

 Chinese translation, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 2000.

Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.

 

MIT Press book page

Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

 The book page CUP book page Chapter 5 was translated to French and published in Critique Economique N°10.Printemps été, 2003

An Edited Book

Game Theory in Economics (editor), Edward Elgar 1990.

My sincere opinion about buying this book

 

Articles

 A note About the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule, Econometrica 47 (1979), 511-514. jstor

False Probabilistic Arguments vs. Faulty Intuition, Israel Law Review 14 (1979), 247-254. pdf

Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9. pdf

An Optimal Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed By Accident in Applied Game Theory, ed. by S Brams, A Schotter and G Schwodiauer, Wurzberg: Physica-Verlag (1979), 406-413. pdf

A Note on the Duty of Disclosure, Economic Letters 4 (1979), 7-11. pdf

science direct Ranking the Participants in a Tournament, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics 38 (1980), 108-111. jstor

Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames, International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 1-12. pdf

Stability of Decision Under Majority Rule, Journal of Economic Theory 23 (1980), 150-159.

front page On An Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, Economic Letters 6 (1980), 89-94. pdf

science direct A Further Characterization of the Scores Method for Multi-Round Tournaments and Social Theory, with S.Nitzan, Public Choice 36 (1981), 153-158. front page

Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-110. jstor

Time Preference, with P.Fishburn, International Economic Review 23 (1982), 677-694.jstor

 Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, with M.E.Yaari, Journal of Economic Theory 30 (1983), 74-97.pdf

The Reasonable Man - A Social Choice Approach, Theory and Decision 15 (1983), 151-159. pdf

Repeated Two Players Game with Ruin, with R.Rosenthal, International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1984), 155-177. front page

The Single Profile Analogies to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach, International Economic Review 25 (1984), 719-730.jstor

Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information, in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining ed by A.Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 99-114. front page

 A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1151-1172. jstor

Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with A.Wolinsky, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150. jstor

Algebraic Aggregation Theory, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 63-77. front page

Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 83-96. pdf

 A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, with J.Ordover, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986), 879-888.jstor

Aggregation of Equivalence Relations, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Classification 3 (1986), 61-65. front page

The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, with K.Binmore and A.Wolinsky, The Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 176-188.jstor

A Sequential Strategic Theory of Bargaining, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. by T Bewley, Cambridge Press (1987), 197-224. front page Middlemen, with A.Wolinsky, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987), 581-594. jstor

The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction, in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (editors), MacMillan Press (1987), 17-32. front page

Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.pdf

The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata, with D.Abreu, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1282. jstor(see also Abreu-Rubinstein (1993))

 Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, G Feiwel (editor), (1989) 243-259. pdf

 Reputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, with L.Kornhauser and C.Wilson, Economica 56 (1989), 15-24.jstor

The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge, American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391.jstor Optimal Flexibility of Rules: The Tale of the Wise Principal and the Naive Agent, European Journal of Political Economics 5 (1989) 219-227. front page

Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, with A.Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 63-78. jstor

 On the Logic of “Agreeing to Disagree” Type Results, with A.Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990), 184-193. front page

New Directions in Economic Theory - Bounded Rationality Revista Espanola De Economie 7 (1990), 3-15. front page

 Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, Econometrica 59 (1991), 909-924. jstor

Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences, with A.Wolinsky, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 600-614.jstor

 On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution, with Z.Safra and W.Thomson, Econometrica, 60 (1992), 1171-1186. jstor

Noncooperative Bargaining Models, with K.Binmore and M.Osborne, Handbook of Game Theory, (Aumann and Hart editors), (1992), 179-225. front page

On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 473-484.jstor

 A Subjective Perspective of the Interpretation of Economic Theory, in Making Modern Economics, The Makers of Modern Economics, vol I, A.Heertje. (ed.) (1993), 67-83. pdf

Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game, with M.Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 160-168.

science direct Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (1994), 299-311. pdf

Equilibrium in Supergames in Essay in Game theory in honor of Michael Maschler, N.Meggiddo (ed.) Springer-Verlag, 1994, 17-28. front page

Remarks on Repeated Extensive Games, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 9(1995), 110-115. pdf

John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(1995), 9-13. pdf

On the Interpretation of Two Game Theoretical Models of Bargaining, in Arrow,K., Mnookin,R., Ross,L. Tversky,A. and R.Wilson (eds.) Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Norton, 1995, 120-130. front page

Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356. jstor An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1996), 32-42.

 science direct Naive Strategies in Zero-sum Games, with A.Tversky and D.Heller, in Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, W.Guth et al. (editors), Springer-Verlag, 1996, 394-402.pdf

 A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, with C.Fershtman, Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (1997), 432-441.

science direct On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24.

science direct The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 121-130.

science direct On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach, with A.Kasher, Logique et Analyse160 (1997), 385-395.pdf

Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with M.Osborne, American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847.jstor

Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 157-173.

science direct Definable Preferences: An Example, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 553-560. pdf

 science direct Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point, with L. Zhou,Mathematics of Social Sciences, 37 (1999), 205-210. pdf

Experience from a Course in Game Theory:Pre and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device,Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 155-170

science direct( Better see an extended "Second Edition" ) A Theorist's View of Experiments, European Economic Review 45 (2001), 615-628. science direct pdf

 Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with J.Glazer Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173.pdf

 Irrational Diversification in Multiple Decision Problems, European Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1369-1378. science directpdf

Comments on Rationalizing Choice Functions which Violate Rationality. with Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler, Econometrica, 70 (2002), 2481-2488. pdf

Definable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town) |in "The Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science", Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Ed. by Peter Gardenfors, et al. Kluwer, 2002, vol I, 235- 243.pdf

Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns, with Michele Piccione, Journal of European Economic Association , 1 (2003), 212-223.pdf

"Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting,International Economic Review 44 (2003), 1207-1216. pdf

html Reviewed in NAJ Economics 1:1 Rejectedfrom QJE(see rejection letter) Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting, with Martin Osborne, Games and Economic Theory, 45 (2003), 434-441. science directpdf

The Curse of Wealth and Power, with Michele Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 119-123.

 science directpdf On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica,72 (2004), 1715-1736. pdf

 Luxury Prices: An Expositionary Note, with Michele Piccione, forthcoming in Samuelsonian Economics and the 21st Century,Ed. byMichael Szenberg pdf Papers in Process: Comments of on the Risk and Time Preferences in Economics, December 2001 pdf

Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione, 2003 pdf Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study, January 2004 pdf

 A Skeptic Comment on the Studies of Economics, 2004 pdf Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist, 2004pdf

 Book Reviews: Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, (Edited by R.M.Hograth and M.W.reder) Economica, 56 (1989), 406-7. jstor

Theory of Industrial Organization by J.Tirole: Economica, 56 (1989), 401-402. jstor Game Theory by Fudenberg, D. and J.Tirole: Economica, 60 (1993), 245-6. jstor

 Fair Division, by Steven Brams and Alan Taylor, Economics and Philosophy, 13 (1997), 113-116.

An Emipirically Based Microeconomics, by Herbert, H. Simon: Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (1999), 1711-2.pdf

The Essential John Nash, by Harold W. Kuhn and Sylvia Nasar (eds.): Times Higher Education Supplement 25 April 2003.html

The Economics of Language, by Donald M. Lamberton (ed.), The Economics Record, 79 (2003), 272-3.pdf

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